Quality of Authoritarianism Data Set

Code Book, Version 1 (March 2020)

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Introduction

This codebook describes the coding procedures for the indicators used to evaluate the quality of authoritarian rule. The Quality of Authoritarianism (QoA) data set is the centerpiece of an accompanying book which addresses the evolution of authoritarian rule in Southeast Asia from 1975 to 2015. This timeframe captures the four decades that followed the start of the "Third Wave of Democratization," including the Cold War and post-Cold War periods (see Huntington, 1991). The goal is to scrutinize the "quality" of authoritarian rule by making a typological distinction between retrograde and sophisticated regimes. Against this backdrop, the QoA data set offers a systematic account of the established features and new techniques authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia have utilized.

Sample

The sample of country years is measured using data on the dichotomous coding of autocracy and democracy from the Boix-Miller-Rosato (2013) data set. This sample is 99.3 percent similar to the data set of Geddes et al. (2014). The country years covered include:

Brunei, 1985-2015
Cambodia, 1975-2015
Indonesia, 1975-1998
Laos, 1975-2015
Malaysia, 1975-2015
Myanmar, 1975-2015
Philippines, 1975-1985
Singapore, 1975-2015
Vietnam, 1975-2015

Sources

The QoA data set is a beneficiary of the recent renaissance in the study of authoritarian politics. To account for the quality of authoritarian rule in Southeast Asia, it extracts information from a variety of data sets within the field of political science (especially Coppedge et al., 2019). The vast majority of this existing information, which is updated where necessary, is included as part of "institutional configuration" and "development scheme" dimensions. In all, 29 indicators are sourced from widely available cross-national time-series data sets within the field of political science. In addition, 14 indicators are sourced from data published by national governments or intergovernmental organizations. Finally, the QoA data set codes 30 original indicators. This information is drawn from country guides, data archives, encyclopedias, government websites, election monitor reports, historical accounts, international organization databases, news reports, political handbooks and records of world events (see the reference list at the end of this codebook). In instances where the question is inapplicable, or data is missing, the response "-9" is entered, unless otherwise noted.

Known Errors: Two coding errors were discovered in the data set after publication of the attached monograph. For QOA_ELECTYPE, no "0" entries were recorded for all country-years. For QOA_PUBINS, no "1" entries were recorded for Vietnam. The overall results are not affected by these errors and they will be corrected in the next version of the data set.

Identification Variables

COW: Correlates of War country code

YEAR: Calendar year

BMR_CASENAME: Consecutive years of the authoritarian regime based on Boix et al. (2013)

BMR_COUNTRY: Lists the full country name in English

List of Indicators

The indicators are clustered and partitioned according to five dimensions: institutional configuration, control system, information apparatus, development scheme and international conduct. See the preferred citation for the rationale behind these dimensions.

Due to the style policy of Cambridge University Press, shorter indicator names were required for Tables 2-6 of the monograph. To help readers navigate the resulting differences, the relevant *monograph entry* is stated for each indicator.

Institutional Configuration

1. QOA_CON
Question: What type of constitution exists?
Monograph Entry: "Constitution type" in Table 2.
Source: Recoded from Law and Versteeg (2013)
Responses:

1: Strong
.66: Modest (sham)
.33: Weak
0: No constitution

2. QOA_EXESEL
Question: What was the mode of selection for chief executive?
Monograph Entry: "Selection mode" in Table 2.
Source: Replication of Cheibub et al. (2010: exselec)
Responses:

1: Direct election (election of the chief executive by popular vote or the election of committed delegates for the purpose of executive selection).
.50: Indirect election (selection of the chief executive by an elected assembly or by an elected but uncommitted electoral college).
0: Non-elective (any means of executive selection not involving a direct or indirect mandate from an electorate).

3. QOA_EXETERM
Question: Does the chief executive rule absent term limits?
Monograph Entry: "Term limits" in Table 2.
Source: Replication of Przeworski (2013: presterm_limit)
Responses:

1: if no term is specified
.80: unlimited number of consecutive terms
.60: out after more than one term, can come back
.40: out after more than one term, can never come back
.20: out after 1 term, can come back
0: out after 1 term, can never come back

4. QOA_EXETERMCHA
Question: If the government executive changed the term limits, what mechanism was used?
Monograph Entry: "Term limits change" in Table 2.
Source: Original coding

Responses:

1: Plebiscite or referendum
.66: Legislative vote
.33: Judicial ruling
0: Executive decree
-9: No change

5. QOA_EXESUC
Question: Were succession rules in place for the selection of the chief executive?
Monograph Entry: "Succession rules" in Table 2.
Source: Replication of Frantz and Stein (2016)
Responses:

1: Designational (chief executives are chosen from within the political elite without formal competition); or regulated (chief executives are determined through hereditary succession or competitive elections).
0: Unregulated (no procedures exist for transferring power between chief executives).

6. QOA_RULCOA
Question: Did the chief executive come from the same ruling coalition as their predecessor?
Monograph Entry: "Succession outcome" in Table 2.
Source: Replication of Svolik (2012: pol_aff)
Responses:

1: Yes (new leader has explicitly stated a pro-government position prior to assuming office)
.5: Unaffiliated (new leader has not unambiguously stated his support or opposition to the government prior to assuming office)
0: No (new leader has explicitly stated an anti-government position prior to assuming office)
-9: The country was newly independent or under occupation.

Clarification: A ruling coalition consists of an uninterrupted succession in office of politically affiliated authoritarian leaders.

7. QOA_ELECTYPE
Question: Was a national election held?
Monograph Entry: "Sanctioned" in Table 2.
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2elmulpar_ord)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not Applicable (non-election year)

8. QOA_EMB
Question: Did the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from the government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?
Monograph Entry: "Administration" in Table 2.
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2elembaut_ord)
Responses:

1: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.
.66: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the de facto ruling body.
.66: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.
.33: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body.
0: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.
-9: No elections

Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

9. QOA_ELECTIME
Question: What were the conditions under which national elections were scheduled?
Monograph Entry: "Scheduling" in Table 2.
Source: Replication of Wig et al. (2015: electtime)
Responses:
1: At the will and timing of the executive (no formal schedule).
.50: Formal mechanisms for scheduling within a fixed interval, but the timing was determined by extant political processes (inexact periods).
0: Formally scheduled elections at fixed intervals (exact periods).
-9: Not applicable (no election)

10. QOA_FPELEC
Question: If yes (QOA_SYSPARTY), did any government-created or government-aligned parties compete in the national election?
Monograph Entry: "Systemic parties" in Table 2 (under Elections).
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not Applicable (no election; no government-created or government-aligned parties)

Clarification: See QOA_SYSPARTY

Note: If the election involves multiple rounds, both rounds are coded.

11. QOA_LEGSEL
Question: What was the mode of selection for legislative members?
Monograph Entry: "Selection mode" in Table 2.
Source: Replication of Cheibub et al. (2010: legselec)
Responses:
1: Elective (legislators, or members of the lower house in a bicameral system, are selected by means of either direct or indirect popular election).

.50: Non-elective legislature (examples include the selection of legislators by the effective executive, or on the basis of heredity or ascription).
0: No legislature exists (includes cases in which there is a constituent assembly without ordinary legislative powers).

Note: In 2011, Myanmar's legislature became a combination of "elective" (75 percent of members) and "non-elective" (25 percent of members). To capture this exception, it was coded as .75.

12. QOA_LEGPAR
Question: Did political parties exist in the legislature?
Monograph Entry: "Pluralism" in Table 2.
Source: Replication of Cheibub et al. (2010: lparty)
Responses:
1: Legislature with multiple parties.
.50: Legislature with only members from the regime party.
0: Either no legislature or all members of the legislature are nonpartisan.

13. QOA_SYSPARTY
Question: Did government-created or government-aligned political parties exist (beyond the incumbent party) within the legislature?
Monograph Entry: "Systemic parties" in Table 2 (under Legislature and parties).
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2psoppaut_ord)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

Clarification: Government-created or government-aligned parties are defined as those lacking autonomy and independence (even as official opposition parties).

Note: This measure captures the degree of party autonomy within a political system. In particular, the existing Varieties of Democracy responses of (1) are coded as "yes" (1) and the responses of (0), (2), (3) and (4) are coded as "no" (0).

14. QOA_COPFOR
Question: Did a government-created cooperative forum permanently exist at the national level?
Monograph Entry: "Cooperative forum" in Table 2.
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

Clarification: In contrast to QOA_ADVCON, a cooperative forum focuses on including business, labor and other special interest groups.

15. QOA_ADVCON
Question: Did a government-created advisory congress (i.e., a systemic legislature) permanently exist at the national level?
Monograph Entry: "Advisory congress" in Table 2.
Source: Original coding

Responses:

1: Yes
0: No

Clarification: In contrast to QOA_COPFOR, an advisory congress focuses on including citizens. It is a non-elected institution that exists in addition to the "real" legislature.

Note: A partially appointed systemic legislature is coded as 1.

Control System

16. QOA_TERROR
Question: What was the overall state of repression?
Monograph Entry: "Political terror scale" in Table 3.
Source: Replication of Wood and Gibney (2010: Amnesty; State Dept)
Responses:

1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
.75: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
.50: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
.25: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
0: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Note: The original Amnesty and United States State Department scores on repression have been inverted and the mean between them calculated. For coding purposes, the range has been rescaled to between 0 ("Terror has expanded to the whole population") and 1 ("Countries under a secure rule of law").

17. QOA_HIGHREP
Question: What was the state of high intensity coercion?
Monograph Entry: "Coercion intensity" in Table 3.
Source: Replication of Cingranelli et al. (2014: physint)
Responses: The CIRI Human Rights Data Project uses an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).

Note: For coding purposes, the range has been rescaled to between 0 and 1. This variable is used as a proxy measurement for high-intensity coercion.

18. QOA_LOWREP
Question: What was the state of low intensity coercion?
Monograph Entry: "Coercion intensity" in Table 3.
Source: Replication of Cingranelli et al. (2014: new_empinx)
Responses: The CIRI Human Rights Data Project uses an additive index constructed from the foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, workers' rights, electoral self-determination and freedom of religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights).

Note: For coding purposes, the range has been rescaled to between 0 and 1. This variable is used as a proxy measurement for low-intensity coercion.

19. QOA_DEFECT
Question: Did any members of the ruling coalition or incumbent party defect to join an existing opposition party or create a new party?
Monograph Entry: "Defected from regime" in Table 3.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: No
0: Yes
-9: No opposition parties are legally allowed to exist

Note: An individual who leaves the ruling coalition and/or incumbent party, but retains a cabinet position, is not coded as defecting.

20. QOA_KILLED
Question: Were any opposition leaders killed?
Monograph Entry: "Killed" in Table 3.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: No
0: Yes
-9: No opposition parties (and thus leaders) are legally allowed to exist

Clarification: An opposition leader is a former head of state or an individual who heads - either on a de jure and de facto basis - any of the three most popular political parties not in the governing coalition.

21. QOA_OPPPRI
Question: Were any opposition leaders presumed missing, under house arrest or confined to prison?
Monograph Entry: "Arrested/imprisoned" in Table 3.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: No
0: Yes
-9: No opposition parties (and thus leaders) are legally allowed to exist

Clarification: See QOA_KILLED for the definition of opposition leader.

22. QOA_OPPEXIT
Question: Were any opposition leaders prevented or banned from leaving the country?
Monograph Entry: "Travel ban" in Table 3.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: No
0: Yes
-9: No opposition parties (and thus leaders) are legally allowed to exist

Clarification: See QOA_KILLED for the definition of opposition leader.

Note: If the opposition leader is imprisoned, they are "not banned" from leaving the country.

23. QOA_OPPLAW
Question: Did a member of the government file or continue to pursue a legal suit (e.g., defamation or libel) against an opposition leader?
Monograph Entry: "Defamation/libel suit" in Table 3.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: No opposition parties (and thus leaders) are legally allowed to exist

Clarification: See QOA_KILLED for the definition of opposition leader.

24. QOA_OPPREG
Question: Did the government file or continue to pursue a regulatory infraction (e.g., health and safety breach) against an opposition party?
Monograph Entry: "Regulatory infraction" in Table 3.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: No opposition parties (and thus leaders) are legally allowed to exist

Note: Alleged infractions to do with the registration of parties are not coded.

25. QOA_OPPCOOP
Question: Were any opposition leaders co-opted into the government, ruling coalition, incumbent party and/or bureaucracy?
Monograph Entry: "Co-opted into regime" in Table 3.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No

Clarification: See QOA_KILLED for the definition of opposition leader.

Note: Opposition leaders who were newly co-opted and were already co-opted are both coded.

26. QOA_ELECBUY
Question: Was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying in the national election?
Monograph Entry: "Election manipulation" in Table 3.
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2elvotbuy_ord)
Responses:

1: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.
.75: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.
.5: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.
.25: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.
0: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.
-9: No election

Clarification: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., "porkbarrel" legislation.

Note: The Varieties of Democracy variable "v2elvotbuy_ord" is being used as an inverted proxy for clientelism, which represents a form of co-optation.

27. QOA_ELECINT
Question: Was there evidence of voter intimidation in the national election?
Monograph Entry: "Election manipulation" in Table 3.
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2elintim_ord)
Responses:

1: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.
.75: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.
.50: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated – harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.
.25: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.
0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.
-9: No election

Clarification: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period are not factored in when scoring this indicator.

28. QOA_ELECPRO
Question: Were there riots and protests after a national election?
Monograph Entry: "Election protest" in Table 3.
Source: Replication of Hyde and Marinov (2012: nelda29)
Responses:
1: No (or unclear)
0: Yes
-9: Not Applicable (no election that year)

Note: This variable has been inverted so that a 1 indicates there were no riots or protests.

29. QOA_PROVIO
Question: If yes (QOA_ELECPRO), did the government use violence against the demonstrators?
Monograph Entry: "Election protest outcome" in Table 3.
Source: Replication of Hyde and Marinov (2012: nelda31)
Responses:
1: No (or unclear)
0: Yes
-9: Not applicable (no protests)

Note: This variable has been inverted so that a 1 indicates no violence.

30. QOA_CS
Question: How robust is civil society?
Monograph Entry: "Operational scope" in Table 3.
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2xcs_ccsi)
Responses: Continuous ranging from 0 (least robust) to 1 (most robust).
Clarification: This variable is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

31. QOA_ANTI-CS
Question: What level of interference was exercised over civil society groups?
Monograph Entry: "Interference level" in Table 3.
Source: Collation of the questions listed below, which are individually sourced.
Responses: Continuous ranging from 0 (low interference) to 1 (high interference).

Note: The responses are coded using the sum of the answers to the questions listed below. The sum ranges from 0 to 12, which has been standardized from 0 to 1.

QOA_REGIS1
Question: Were NGOs required to register with the government?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No
QOA_REGIS2
Question: If yes (QOA_REGIS1), is registration burdensome?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)

Responses:
1: Yes (Process is characterized by delayed, vague, onerous procedures)
0: No (Process is well-defined and timely)

QOA_APPEAL

Question: If yes (QOA_REGIS1), were NGOs granted a legal right to appeal if denied registration?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

QOA_BARRIERS

Question: If yes (QOA_REGIS1), were barriers to entry different for NGOs receiving foreign funds?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: Yes (more burdensome)
0: No (the same or less burdensome)

QOA_DISCLOSE

Question: Were NGOs required to disclose their funding sources to the government?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

QOA_GOVAPPR

Question: Did NGOs need prior approval from the government to receive foreign funding?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

QOA_CHANL

Question: Were NGOs required to channel foreign funding through state-owned banks or government ministries?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

QOA_FORFND

Question: Were all NGOs prohibited from receiving foreign funds?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: No
.5: Partially (up to a certain threshold)
0: Yes

QOA_FORFND_CT

Question: Was a category of NGOs prohibited from receiving foreign funds?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: Partially (up to a certain threshold)
.5: Yes
0: No

QOA_NGO_ACT
Question: Did the law restrict NGOs from engaging in political activities?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: Partially (the government regulates the topics that NGOs may address and/or the ability to publicly express political views).
.5: Yes
0: No

QOA_NGO_INT
Question: Did the government use intimidation or dissolution to deter NGOs from engaging in political activities?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: No
0: Yes

QOA_NGO_RES
Question: Were restrictions on political activities different for NGOs receiving foreign funds?
Source: Replication of Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 2a-d; 3a-c; 3e-f; 4a-c)
Responses:
1: Yes (more restrictive)
0: No (same or less restrictive)

32. QOA_YOUTH
Question: Did the government party maintain a permanent youth group or movement?
Monograph Entry: "Youth" in Table 3.
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No (or unclear)

Note: The source of the youth group or movement, be it the incumbent party, national police or government ministry, is not distinguished. All sources are instead coded as part of the government.

33. QOA_YOUTHARM
Question: If yes (QOA_YOUTH), was the youth group or movement armed?
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No (or unclear)

Note: "Armed" includes the most basic of weapons, such as guns, clubs, knives and sticks.

34. QOA_YOUTHELEC
Question: If yes (QOA_YOUTH), did the government deploy the youth group or movement for a national election?
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No (or unclear)

-9: Not Applicable (no election)

35. QOA_VETERAN
Question: Did the government party maintain a permanent veteran's group or movement?
Monograph Entry: "Veterans" in Table 3.
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No (or unclear)

Note: The source of the youth group or movement, be it the incumbent party, national police or government ministry, is not distinguished. All sources are instead coded as part of the government.

36. QOA_VETERANARM
Question: If yes (QOA_VETERAN), was the veteran's group or movement armed?
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No (or unclear)

Note: "Armed" includes the most basic of weapons, such as guns, clubs, knives and sticks.

37. QOA_VETERANELEC
Question: If yes (QOA_VETERAN), did the government deploy the veteran's group or movement for a national election?
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No (or unclear)
-9: Not Applicable (no election)

38. QOA_AUXGRO
Question: Did the government provide de-facto support to an auxiliary group capable of administering repression?
Monograph Entry: "Auxiliary group" in Table 3.
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes (established)
.5: Unclear (rumored)
0: No

Clarification: Only groups who have previously committed repression are coded.

Note: This variable codes any group operating at any time not already captured by the QOA_YOUTH and QOA_VETERANS variables.

Information Apparatus

39. QOA_COLINFO1
Question: Did the government maintain a local institution (e.g., a consultative forum, meet the people sessions) that was designed, either implicitly or explicitly, to collect information about the beliefs, grievances and/or preferences of citizens?
Monograph Entry: "Local organization" in Table 4.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No (or unclear)

Note: "Local" refers to the lowest level of state administration in a given country.

40. QOA_COLINFO2
Question: Did the government maintain a research center that was designed, either implicitly or explicitly, to collect electronic data about the beliefs, grievances and/or preferences citizens expressed online?
Monograph Entry: "Digital center" in Table 4.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No (or unclear)

41. QOA_CEN
Question: Did the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?
Monograph Entry: "Media censorship" in Table 4.
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2mecenefm_ord)
Responses:

1: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.
.75: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.
.50: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.
.25: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.
0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.
-9: No data.

Clarification: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery. The focus is not censorship of topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

42. QOA_INTCEN
Question: Did the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?
Monograph Entry: "Internet censorship" in Table 4.
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2mecenefi_ord)
Responses:

1: The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.
.75: The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.
.50: The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned below.
.25: The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.
0: This country has no Internet access at all.
-9: No data; internet not yet invented.

Clarification: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. The focus is not censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. The focus is also not the extent of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

43. QOA_TROLL
Question: Is there evidence that the government paid some citizens to provide positive commentary of its activities on websites and/or social media platforms?
Monograph Entry: "Propaganda" in Table 4.
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

Clarification: The existence of troll armies is being used as a narrow proxy for modern propaganda.

44. QOA_RESPOND
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent did political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?
Monograph Entry: "Counterclaims" in Table 4.
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2dlcountr_ord)
Responses:
1: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part (i.e., "accepted but later rejected).
.80: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them (i.e., "noted but indifferent").
.60: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position (i.e., "noted and reconciled").
.40: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them (i.e., "allowed and degraded").

.20: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored (i.e., "allowed and ignored").
0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished (i.e., "prohibited and punished").

Clarification: Since discourse varies greatly from person to person, this measure is based on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

45. QOA_ANTICORR
Question: Did the government maintain an anti-corruption unit premised on being independent from the government?
Monograph Entry: "Anti-corruption unit" in Table 4.
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Nominally independent
.5: Not independent
0: Does not exist

46. QOA_GONGO
Question: Is there evidence the government coordinated the national activities of a non-government organization?
Monograph Entry: "GONGOs" in Table 4.
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

Note: A government operated non-government organization maintains the outward appearance of independence, but subtly advances government positions (see Dobson, 2012; Walker, 2016).

47. QOA_PUBINS
Question: Is there evidence the government provided support, either directly or indirectly, to a public policy institute that claims to be independent?
Monograph Entry: "Policy institute" in Table 4.
Source: Original coding
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

48. QOA_DMON
Question: Were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?
Monograph Entry: "Election observers" in Table 4.
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2eldommon)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not applicable (no election)

49. QOA_DMONFAKE

Question: Is there evidence the government deployed a nominally independent domestic observation group during a national election?
Monograph Entry: "Election observers" in Table 4.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not applicable (no election)

Note: A nominally independent election observation group is a domestic organisation that maintains the outward appearance of independence, but always endorses the integrity of an election. They are modelled on international "shadow" observation groups (see QOA_IMONFAKE).

Development Scheme

50. QOA_POLCOR
Question: How pervasive was political corruption?
Monograph Entry: "Political" in Table 5.
Source: Adapted from Coppedge et al. (2019: e_v2x_corr_4C)
Responses:

1: Never
.66: Occasional
.33: Often
0: Constant

Clarification: The Varieties of Democracy corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive (at the level of the rulers/cabinet) on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation.

Note: This variable has been inverted so that a 1 indicates there was no corruption.

51. QOA_EXCOR
Question: How routinely did members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often did they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?
Monograph Entry: "Executive" in Table 5.
Source: Adapted from Coppedge et al. (2019: e_v2x_execorr_4C)
Responses:

1: Never
.66: Occasional
.33: Often
0: Constant

Clarification: See QOA_POLCOR

Note: This variable has been inverted so that a 1 indicates there was no corruption.

52. QOA_PSCOR
Question: To what extent did public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often did they steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?
Monograph Entry: "Public-sector" in Table 5.
Source: Adapted from Coppedge et al. (2019: e_v2x_pubcorr_4C)
Responses:

1: Never
.66: Occasional
.33: Often
0: Constant

Clarification: See QOA_POLCOR

Note: This variable has been inverted so that a 1 indicates there was no corruption.

53. QOA_MILEXP
Question: Did military expenditure (as a percentage of gross domestic product) increase?
Monograph Entry: "Military expenditure" in Table 5.
Source: World Bank (2019)
Responses:

1: Yes (or remained the same)
0: No

54. QOA_TAXREV
Question: Did the amount of tax revenue received by the government increase?
Monograph Entry: "Tax revenue" in Table 5.
Source: World Bank (2019)
Responses:

1: Yes (or remained the same)
0: No

55. QOA_FDI
Question: Did the amount of foreign direct investment (net inflows) increase?
Monograph Entry: "Direct investment" in Table 5.
Source: World Bank (2019)
Responses:

1: Yes (or remained the same)
0: No

56. QOA_FORAID
Question: Did the net official developmental assistance received increase?
Monograph Entry: "Foreign aid" in Table 5.
Source: World Bank (2019)
Responses:

1: Yes (or remained the same)
0: No
-9: Not required due to developed economy status

57. QOA_GDPPC
Question: Did the gross domestic product per capita increase?
Monograph Entry: "Gross Domestic product" in Table 5.
Source: World Bank (2019)
Responses:
1: Yes (or remained the same)
0: No

58. QOA_INFLATION
Question: Was the rate of inflation two percent or less?
Monograph Entry: "Inflation rate ≤ 2%" in Table 5.
Source: World Bank (2019)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

59. QOA_UNEMPLOY
Question: Did the national rate of unemployment (as a percentage of the total labor force) decrease?
Monograph Entry: "Unemployment rate" in Table 5.
Source: World Bank (2019)
1: Yes (or remained the same)
0: No

60. QOA_EDU
Question: Did government expenditure on education (as a total percentage of gross domestic product) increase?
Monograph Entry: "Education spending" in Table 5.
Source: World Bank (2019)
1: Yes (or remained the same)
0: No

61. QOA_HEALTH
Question: Did government expenditure on health (as a total percentage of gross domestic product) increase?
Monograph Entry: "Health care spending" in Table 5.
Source: World Bank (2019)
1: Yes (or remained the same)
0: No

International Conduct

62. QOA_HR
Question: What is the rate of adoption on international human rights agreements?
Monograph Entry: "Human rights ratification" in Table 6.

Source: Collation of the questions listed below, which are individually sourced.
Responses: Continuous ranging from 0 (lowest level of ratification) to 1 (highest level of ratification).

Note: The responses are coded using the sum of the answers to the questions listed below. The sum ranges from 0 to 12, which has been standardized from 0 to 1.

QOA_HR_GEN
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

QOA_HR_REF
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

QOA_HR_RAC
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

QOA_HR_ECON
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

QOA_HR_CIV
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No

QOA_HR_WOM
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:
1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not applicable (did not exist)

QOA_HR_TOR
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not applicable (did not exist)

QOA_HR_CHI
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not applicable (did not exist)

QOA_HR_IND
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not applicable (did not exist)

QOA_HR_MIG
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not applicable (did not exist)

QOA_HR_DIS
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the Convention on Persons with Disabilities (2006)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not applicable (did not exist)

QOA_HR_ENF
Question: Was the government a ratifying party to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006)?
Source: United Nations (2018d)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not applicable (did not exist)

63. QOA_UNHRC

Question: Did the government have membership on the United Nations Human Rights Council and, previously, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights?
Monograph Entry: "UNHRC membership" in Table 6.
Source: United Nations (2018a)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No

64. QOA_UNSCR
Question: Was the government criticized and/or condemned through a United Nations Security Council resolution?
Monograph Entry: "UNSC criticism" in Table 6.
Source: United Nations (2018c)
Responses:

1: No
0: Yes

65. QOA_SANCTIONS
Question: Was the government the target of economic sanctions by the United States and/or the United Nations?
Monograph Entry: "Economic sanctions" in Table 6.
Source: Replication of Hufbauer et al. (2009); Morgan et al. (2014: primarysender)
Responses:

1: No
0: Yes

66. QOA_UNSCV
Question: Was a United Nations Security Council resolution critical of the government vetoed by one of the permanent five members (i.e., China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States)?
Monograph Entry: "UNSC veto" in Table 6.
Source: United Nations (2018b)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: No resolution

67. QOA_IMON
Question: Were international election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?
Monograph Entry: "Election observers" in Table 6.
Source: Replication of Coppedge et al. (2019: v2elintmon)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No (or unclear)
-9: Not applicable (no election)

68. QOA_IMONFAKE
Question: Is there evidence the government deployed a nominally independent international observation group during a national election (i.e., a "shadow" group)?

Monograph Entry: "Election observers" in Table 6.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No
-9: Not applicable (no election)

Note: A nominally independent international is an intergovernmental organisation or closely related international non-governmental organisation that has a low 'democratic density' of member states (i.e., a majority of autocratic states) and is not a signatory to the *Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers* (2005). See Debre and Morgenbesser (2017).

69. QOA_PARALL
Question: Did the incumbent party maintain an alliance - formalized through an agreement - with the incumbent party of another authoritarian regime?
Monograph Entry: "Ruling party alliance" in Table 6.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes (for each confirmed alliance)
0: No

70. QOA_PRFIRM
Question: Did the government hire – or continue to employ – a public relations firm based in the United States?
Monograph Entry: "Public relations firm" in Table 6.
Source: United States Department of Justice (2019)
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No

71. QOA_THINK
Question: Is there evidence the government provided any funding to a think tank based in the United States?
Monograph Entry: "Think tank" in Table 6.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No

72. QOA_RADIO
Question: Is there evidence the government operated, either directly or indirectly, a radio station?
Monograph Entry: "Overseas radio station" in Table 6.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No

Clarification: The radio station can be based either in the country or overseas

73. QOA_TV
Question: Is there evidence the government operated, either directly or indirectly, a television station?
Monograph Entry: "Overseas television station" in Table 6.
Source: Original coding
Responses:

1: Yes
0: No

Clarification: The television station can be based either in the country or overseas.

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